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Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and 
the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan 
Kerry E. Irish 
Abstract 
This article takes the view that Dwight D. Eisenhower's work as a 
staff officer in the War Department in the early 1930s was signifi-
cant not only for his own career, but also for the United States. In 
these years, Eisenhower wrote the first detailed industrial mobi-
lization plan, the blueprint the nation would follow if it entered a 
major war. Though not formally implemented in 1941, much of 
Eisenhower's plan provided the basis for a more efficient transition 
to war production than had occurred during World War I. Moreover, 
his work enhanced his reputation in the Army. 
I N late 1929 Major Dwight D. Eisenhower went to work in the War Department for Brigadier General George van Hom Moseley, an 
adviser to Assistant Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley, Mose-
ley-and now Eisenhower-were primarily concerned with developing a 
plan for mobilizing American industry to supply the military with the 
accoutrements of war in timely fashion, something it had largely failed 
to do in the Great War.l Eisenhower would spend two and one-half years 
of his life working on the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP) and 
related matters. 
Unfortunately, Eisenhower scholars have not taken the time to 
investigate or understand this era of their subject's life; most have dis-
1. Paul A. C. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspec-
tive (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 30, 40. 
Kerry E. Irish earned a B.A. in history at George Fox University and a Ph.D. at 
the University of Washington. He is currently working on a study of the early life 
and career of Dwight Eisenhower. He is a professor of American history at George 
Fox University, Newberg, Oregon. 
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missed it as unimportant or given it little attention.2 It was not unim-
portant. Eisenhower's work in the early 1930s, especially on the Indus-
trial Mobilization Plan, had a significant impact on his development. 
Indeed, it was the basis for his understanding of what he eventually 
called the "military-industrial complex." Eisenhower's work in these 
years provided him with detailed information and deep experience 
regarding industrial production for war and first-hand knowledge of lead-
ing Army officers, important businessmen, and government officials. 
Indeed, Eisenhower contributed more to the 1930 IMP than any other 
Army officer. Additionally, and thus helping to demonstrate the signifi-
cance of Eisenhower's work in this era, the 1930 Industrial Mobilization 
Plan constituted an important element in the military preparedness of 
the United States. The 1930 IMP was the basis for all of the industrial 
mobilization plans that followed, and the work done on these plans did 
indeed aid in industrial production during World War II in spite of the 
fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not formally adopt the 
Army plan. Finally, it was Eisenhower's work on the Industrial Mobiliza-
tion Plan that brought him to the attention of Army Chief of Staff Dou-
glas MacArthur. 
Some background information is helpful in understanding the signif-
icance of this era in Eisenhower's life and for the nation. The legislation 
that mandated creation of an industrial mobilization plan was the 
National Defense Act of 1920. That act found its genesis in the inade-
quate American industrial response to the Great War. The lack of prewar 
planning for industrial mobilization had led to confusion, bottlenecks, 
and delay in supplying American troops, delay that ultimately meant 
unnecessary deaths. This shortage of U.S. weapons made training diffi-
cult and stretched the resources of America's allies.3 Congress, at least 
for a few months after the conclusion of the war in November 1918, was 
2. See Piers Brendon, Ike: His Life and Times (New York: Harper and Row, 
1986), 58; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-
Elect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 88, 92 (Ambrose does allow 
that Eisenhower's work did add to his education); Kenneth S. Davis, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower: Soldier of Democracy (New York: Konecky and Konecky, 1945), 229; Geoffrey 
Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 106-9; Rick Atkinson, An 
Army at Dawn: 'fhe War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 2002), 59. 
3. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilwtion, a volume in United 
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of Military History, United States 
Army, 1959), 35; Martin Blumenson, Heroes Ne'Oer Die: Warriors and Waifare in 
World War II (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 212; Terrence J. Gough, "Sol-
diers, Businessmen and US Industrial Planning Between the World Wars," War and 
Society 9 (May 1991): 63. 
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determined that such a tragic waste of men and time should not be 
repeated.4 
The Assistant Secretary of War was the civilian official given respon-
sibility for developing an IMP. 5 The Army gave the following definition of 
such a plan: 
Mobilization of industry for military purposes during a national 
emergency is the operation of adjusting peace time energy and 
industry to meet the essential requirements of national life, and the 
maximum requirements of military effort, with a minimum of dis-
turbance of normal conditions.6 
Though Congress had mandated these plans, it is important to note 
that the plans the Assistant Secretary's office created, since they 
involved the bureaucratic machinery of the federal government, neces-
sarily took the form of a recommendation to the President. 7 The Army 
then found itself hampered in the creation of an industrial mobilization 
plan by the fact it could never be certain that the President or Congress 
would adopt the plan at the appropriate moment.8 
Throughout the 1920s the Army devoted most of its efforts to sup-
plying its forces as opposed to planning for industrial mobilization dur-
ing war. This apathy toward planning, and the determination of both 
Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge to cut the military 
budget, aroused the ire of Bernard Baruch, who had headed the War 
Industries Board (WIB) during the Great War. That body had guided the 
wartime industrial production of the nation. 9 Once the war ended, the 
WIB passed away. Baruch was determined to create some civilian-led 
permanent body, along the lines of the WIB, that would prepare and 
organize American industrial production for rapid and efficient conver-
sion to wartime needs.10 To this fight, which he waged throughout the 
twenties and thirties, Baruch brought the prestige of his war service and 
the fact that he was a highly successful and respected financier and stock 
4. Albert Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," in American Ci'Vil-Military 
Decisions, ed. Harold Stein (University: University of Alabama Press, 1962), 63; 
Harold W. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1940 (Washington: 
Historical Section, General Administrative Services Division, Office of the Quarter-
master General, 1943), 4, 5. 
5. Robert Miller, "The United States Army During the 1930s" (Ph.D. diss., 
Princeton University, 1973), 40, 41; John Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed 
Forces: A Study of Presidential Attitudes and Policy" (Ph.D. diss. , Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1971), 92. 
6. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 57. 
7. Ibid., 13, 14. 
8. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 73. 
9. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex, 33. 
10. Ibid., 51. 
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speculator. Indeed, in 1929, Baruch advised many of his friends, includ-
ing Will Rogers and General John J. Pershing, to get out of the stock mar-
ket before the great crash. 11 It was Baruch's pressure on the War 
Department that had led to the creation of the Army Industrial College 
in 1924, but this hardly satisfied Baruch.12 He even used his own money 
to pay for the expert advice of sociologists, political scientists, econo-
mists, and statisticians in formulating his industrial mobilization plan.13 
As the 1920s passed, the Army bandied about ideas for a supera-
gency such as the Great War's War Industries Board; still, there was no 
detailed IMP.14 Indeed, many Army officers resented what they regarded 
as civilian interference in Army matters and did not want the War 
Department to develop an IMP that featured civilian control of Army pro-
curement. Even General Charles P. Summerall (Army Chief of Staff from 
1926 to 1930) opposed such work.15 Undaunted, Baruch and other con-
cerned citizens, including Brigadier General Hugh S. Johnson and other 
Baruch associates from the WIB, kept pressure on political leaders and 
the War Department to formulate a detailed IMP, one that featured a 
civilian-dominated government agency to coordinate war production.16 
But Baruch and his allies beat their heads against a deaf and dumb body 
politic. The Coolidge administration (1923-29) and an increasingly iso-
lationist populace were determined to cut defense spending and de-
emphasize the military.17 Army officers in the Planning Branch, forced 
by lack of resources to focus on immediate procurement needs, found lit-
tle time in the mid-twenties to add to their admittedly sketchy IMP.18 
However, by 1928 the Army had managed to produce its most detailed, 
though still rudimentary, IMP. Referred to as the Basic Procurement 
11. Maury Klein, Rainbows End: The Crash of 1929 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 193; Jordan A. Schwarz, The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Wash-
ington, 1917-1965 (Chapel HiU: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 169. 
12. Schwarz, The Speculator, 3-8, 336. 
13. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization 
in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), 
512. 
14. Ibid., 504; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 68, 79, 80, 81; 
Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 65; Schwarz, The Speculator, 335. 
15. George van Horn Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey, vol. II ," unpublished 
memoir, George Van Horn Moseley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.; 116; Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 77. 
16. Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 65; Kreidberg and Henry, His-
tory of Military Mobilization, 512; Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex, 51. 
17. Schwarz, The Speculator, 335; Smith, The Army and Economic Mobiliza-
tion, 73, 74. 
18. War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President (Washing-
ton: GPO, 1931), 25; Thatcher, Plannin~for Industrial Mobilization, 82; Kreidberg 
and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 504-7. 
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Plan, it featured civilian-dominated "war service committees," which 
were to act as liaisons between industry and the War Department; it also 
raised the possibility of coercion of labor during war.19 
Ironically, movement toward a more highly developed IMP gathered 
force when Herbert C. Hoover, one of the most peace-oriented presidents 
in American history, became chief executive in 1929. Hoover, though a 
determined advocate for peace, was not a total pacifist; he was a gifted 
organizer, a thorough leader, and a realist. Assistant Secretary of War 
Patrick Hurley-with the guidance and energy of Moseley-produced the 
next step in the IMP in 1929.20 Known as the "Hurley Plan," the 1929 
IMP featured an example of Moseley's creativity: a new cabinet-level 
position to be activated when the President declared a war emergency. 
That day was known as M-Day, defined by the War Department as the 
first day of mobilization, and would most likely be synonymous with a 
declaration of war, but not automatically so.21 This new secretary would 
"act for President on all nat. def. matters," which actually included all 
areas in procurement and industrial mobilization since other areas of 
national defense came under the Secretary of War.22 
The Hurley Plan was intended to be the catalyst for discussion of 
how best to proceed. It certainly served that purpose. The proposed new 
cabinet position was almost universally condemned. Bernard Baruch 
criticized the idea as disruptive to war production: the new secretary 
would replace existing authority at just the moment when established 
relationships and procedures were most needed to facilitate war produc-
tion.23 Interestingly, Moseley's more ambitious ideas were not repre-
sented in the IMP; privately, he advocated the creation of a Department 
of Defense, which would unify all the services and their needs under one 
office. Moseley, in this regard, was ahead of his time.24 Prophetically, 
some critics worried that if the War Department plans were too compre-
hensive, or centralized too much authority in one man or group of men, 
19. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 71, 72, 78, 79; Kreidberg 
and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 504, 505. 
20. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 84, 85. See also Thatcher's 
footnotes numbered 68 and 69, crediting Hurley; Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-
Day Plan," 65; Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 140. 
21. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 58, 85. 
22. Chief of Staff Diary, 12 November 1930, in Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries 
and Selected Papers, 1905-1941, ed. Daniel Holt and James Leyerzapf (Baltimore, 
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 145; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial 
Mobilization, 85; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 507. 
23. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89; Kreid-
berg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 508. 
24. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 508. 
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they might be ignored by a president zealous for his own authority, or 
distrustful of businessmen or the military.25 
The Hurley IMP was to be revised every other year so as to remain 
current and viable relative to the Army's probable role in any national 
emergency.26 Unfortunately, the Army's mission was no more clearly 
defined in 1930 than it had been in 1920; indeed, one could add 1940 as 
well. For example, many fundamental questions had no definitive 
answers: What were United States security interests? Would the country 
fight for the Philippines? Who were its most likely enemies in war: Great 
Britain, Mexico, Germany, or Japan? And what kind of war would be 
waged against that enemy; would the Army fight for the Philippines or 
would that war be a Navy show? With little guidance from the President 
or the State Department, the Army adopted the wisest and most cautious 
approach: prepare for the biggest war imaginable-in other words, a 
repeat of the Great War. 27 
Dwight Eisenhower came to the War Department convinced that 
thorough planning for a future war was an absolute must in the modern 
world. Eisenhower had attended the Army War College in 1927-28. 
While there he had co-written a major research paper entitled "War and 
its Principles, Methods, and Doctrines" and was the sole author of 
another important work entitled "An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular 
Army." Both works emphasize the point that in future wars, fortune 
would favor those nations that had engaged in extensive preparation in 
both manpower and industrial capacity. In "War and its Principles," 
Eisenhower wrote: 
It will be shown that though the actual conflict (battle) is waged 
between armed forces which have been prepared for battle, the 
preparation and maintenance of those forces requires the utmost in 
industrial organization, and free access to sources of raw materials. 28 
Eisenhower went on to assert his belief that preparation, or lack of it, 
may decide the conflict: 
Modem war is fought between armed forces composed of men and 
materials which have been specially prepared for battle. Lacking 
25. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 89. 
26. War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1931, 26. 
27. Miller, "The United States Army in the 1930s," 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75; 
Mark A . Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, 
and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000), 2, 3, 6. 
28. Dwight Eisenhower et al., Army War College Paper: "War and its Principles, 
Methods, and Doctrines," File: Army, A-Army, Z (misc.), Box 2, Name Series, Princi-
pal Files, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916-52 (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter EL), Abilene, Kansas. 
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such preparation, men and materials on the battlefield are useless, 
and preparation consumes an appreciable period of time. [Emphasis 
in the original)29 
Eisenhower, in opposition to conventional wisdom, believed that the 
next war would likely feature an enemy with a highly mobile and mas-
sive offensive capability; there would be little time to organize a response 
to such a foe.30 Making matters worse and prewar planning even more 
important, the United States had little in the way of a permanent "muni-
tions industry." Most of the corporations that would supply the Ameri-
can soldier would have to convert to war production. 31 Finally, he 
believed that given the American democratic system, an agency that 
would coordinate the nation's military response had to be both powerful 
and led by civilians. 32 Eisenhower, then, was not just passing time in 
these years, but was attempting to put in place a program he believed 
was the cornerstone of national defense. 
In working for Moseley, Eisenhower was reunited with fellow West 
Pointer Wade H. Haislip (U.S. Military Academy, 1912) and best friend 
Leonard T. Gerow, with whom he had studied at the Command and Gen-
eral Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1925-26. Eisenhower had grad-
uated first in his class, Gerow eleventh. They were a great team.33 
Eisenhower also had the opportunity to renew a friendship with another 
old comrade, George S. Patton, who had been assigned to the office of 
the Chief of Cavalry in 1928.34 
George Moseley was an interesting combination of prejudices, opin-
ions, charm, and talent. In the Great War, Moseley had, by all accounts, 
done a masterful job as G-4 of the American Expeditionary Forces 
(AEF), the officer in charge of supply. Indeed, it seems his reputation 
was as lofty as that of Pershing's G-3 (operations), Fox Conner .. That 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid.; Dwight Eisenhower, "An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army," Mem-
orandum for the Assistant Commandant, Army War College, 15 March 1928, in Holt 
and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 62-78; Ben-
jamin F. Cooling, "Dwight D. Eisenhower at the Army War College, 1927-1928," Para-
meters 5 (1975): 26, 27; Dwight Eisenhower, "War Policies," Cavalry Journal, 
November 1931, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and 
Selected Papers, 199. 
31. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 60. 
32. Schwarz, The Speculator, 337. 
33. Chief of Staff Diary, 9 November 1929, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 
The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 111; Perret, Eisenhower, 95, 106. A memo 
in Eisenhower's 201 File lists the class standing. Some sources have Gerow finishing 
number two, but this is inaccurate. 
34. Carlo D'Este, Patton: A Genius For War (New York: Harper Collins Publish-
ers, 1995), 341, 346. 
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Eisenhower would spend years working for both men was indeed fortu-
nate in terms of both his education and his career. 
Eisenhower saw Moseley as a "brilliant officer" who inspired and 
encouraged creativity in his subordinates.35 He appreciated Moseley's 
organizational genius.36 As noted above, Moseley often solved problems 
in unconventional ways; he was not a stickler for Army regulations. He 
prized common sense above traditional methods.37 This appealed to 
Eisenhower, who usually loved both minor rebellions and creative think-
ing: his career at West Point comes to mind, as do his tank doctrines and 
fondness for new methods of waging war. To have a superior officer actu-
ally encourage original thought was irresistibly refreshing. Moseley gave 
his aides important work to do and relied heavily upon that work.38 
There were, of course, limits to creative freedom. The Army was not a 
democracy. Once Moseley had made a decision, it had to be fully and 
professionally executed. Eisenhower understood and appreciated the 
fact that Moseley expected his officers to advance the ideas and pro-
grams of the commanding officer. 39 
Some authors have argued that Eisenhower was unusually reluctant 
to share his opinions with superior officers, and that he was overly sub-
ject to the opinions of stronger men.40 Eisenhower's willingness to learn 
from others has been misunderstood as mental weakness. He had a great 
talent for assessing character, for gauging what he could say and how he 
could say it to any given person. He and Fox Conner, during their time 
together in the Panama Canal Zone in the early 1920s, had argued at 
length and loudly over military tactics. With Moseley, Eisenhower 
enjoyed political discussions. Moseley was fully aware that the younger 
man was not nearly as conservative as he was. In September 1943 he 
wrote Eisenhower a letter that discussed the presidential election in 
1944: 
In his broadcast last Sunday night, Walter Winchell stated that if the 
Republicans ran [Douglas J MacArthur as President, Mr. Roosevelt 
35. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The 
Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 225-27; Dwight Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I 
Thll to Friends (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), 210; Matthew 
Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 160. 
36. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 108; Dwight Eisenhower to George 
Van Horn Moseley, 11 June 1943, File: Moseley, George Van Horn, Box 84, Principal 
File, Pre-Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Papers, EL. 
37. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 109. 
38. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 119. 
39. Dwight Eisenhower to George Van Horn Moseley, 23 November 1934, Mose-
ley File, EL. 
40. Brendon, Ike, 10, 13, 58, 59, 109, 110; Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, Gen-
eral of the Anny, President-Elect, 72, 73. 
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would take you on as his running mate. I have no respect whatsoever 
for Mr. Winchell, but sometimes he gets the news quite accurate.41 
Moseley clearly had reason to believe that Eisenhower would be accept-
able to Roosevelt; certainly the idea did not surprise him. Eisenhower 
had appreciated much about the Democrats when he was a young man; 
he also admired some aspects of FDR's New Deal. One can easily imag-
ine that he and Moseley had interesting discussions in the early 1930s. 42 
In late 1929, Eisenhower and Major Gilbert Wilkes, an engineer also 
assigned to work on the IMP, began "intriguing and frustrating" work on 
that plan. 43 In response to the criticism of Baruch and others, Moseley 
ordered adjustments to the IMP.44 For example, Baruch had suggested 
that Moseley's proposed separate department of munitions be elimi-
nated. Moseley acquiesced; the munitions department was integrated 
into the IMP.45 He did not, however, give up his idea of a new cabinet-
level position.46 In addition to these adjustments, Eisenhower and Wilkes 
visited various manufacturers and asked to see their old plans for con-
version to war production. The two officers requested suggestions as to 
how such plans might be improved. But few businessmen, or politicians 
for that matter, were interested in talking about conversion plans. Rather 
than anticipating fat contracts for war production, most industrialists 
were concerned that cooperation with the Army might force them to 
reveal trade secrets, or, should war come, result in loss of control of their 
own businesses. Furthermore, most Americans believed there would not 
be another major warY 
In December 1929, Hoover had promoted the energetic Hurley to 
the post of Secretary of War; he was the first such secretary to have car-
ried a rifle in the Army as a private. As secretary, Hurley had even 
greater authority to see the IMP revised and implemented; the extremely 
41. George Van Horn Moseley to Dwight Eisenhower, 29 September 1943, Mose-
ley File, EL. 
42. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1933, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The 
Prewar Diaries, 229, 251, 252 (the entry on page 229 concerning Hugh Johnson is 
dated June 1932; however, the context of Ike's comments makes clear that the date 
must be later, perhaps 1933, since Ike remarks that Hugh Johnson is head of the 
National Recovery Administration); Chief of Staff Diary, 20 April and 2 June 1933, in 
Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 251, 252. 
43. Eisenhower, At Ease, 210. 
44. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 90. 
45. Ibid., 90, 91. 
46. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 508; Chief of Staff 
Diary, 12 November 1930, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries 
and Selected Papers, 145. 
47. Eisenhower, At Ease, 210, 211; Miller, "The United States Army in the 
1930s," 78, 79; Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: G. P. Put-
nam's Sons, 1987), 250. 
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competent Moseley carried on his duties without the aid of an assistant 
secretary of war until April 1930 when the President gave Frederick H. 
Payne the job.48 
Payne loved the Army, and Eisenhower soon gained his confidence.49 
In June 1930 the major wrote an article for the Assistant Secretary. Pub-
lished under the latter's name in Army Ordnance, the article outlined 
Payne's and Eisenhower's basic IMP ideas. Many Army officers, like Chief 
of Staff Summerall, opposed any further civilian "meddling" in the Army. 
Others were suspicious of, if not hostile to, such activity and prone to 
credit exaggerations. The article was an attempt to ease fears and 
explain the reality of modem war. Eisenhower emphasized four areas of 
concern. First, he calmed nerves and dispelled rumors: there would be 
no nationalization of industry under the plan, and chief executive offi-
cers would not become colonels, ordered about like lackeys. Nor would 
every aspect of production be regimented. Indeed, the planners hoped to 
avoid unnecessary disruption of the domestic economy and culture. 50 
Second, Eisenhower explained that modem war was a conflict 
between economies; production of the weapons and supplies of war was 
as important as sound strategy and tactics.51 He no doubt recalled his 
Great War efforts to train tank crews with no tanks at Camp Colt, Penn-
sylvania (on the old Gettysburg battlefield). 
Third, an organization that coordinated planning and production 
was an absolute must if waste and delay were to be avoided. Only gov-
ernment was large and powerful enough to serve that function. There-
fore, Eisenhower, drawing in part on Baruch's ideas, envisioned an 
agency that would exercise that control.52 He described it as follows: 
Consequently, in the event of war, a great industrial organization will 
certainly be a part of the Federal government during the period of 
the emergency. This organization must be made up of leaders in all 
the branches of industry. Representatives of labor, of manufacturers, 
of financiers, of the professions, of agriculturalists, of producers of 
raw materials and so on must combine in an organization under the 
48. Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 97-98; Moseley, "One Sol-
dier's Journey," 122. 
49. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 128. 
SO. Frederick H. Payne, "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization," an article 
prepared by Major Eisenhower for Payne, published in Army Ordnance; hereafter 
Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization." A copy of the article 
with the notation that Eisenhower had written it is in File 875, Box 84, Assistant Sec-
retary of War, Planning Branch, Record Group (RG) 107, National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland. The article can also be 
found in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 
138-42. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211. 
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President to guide our industrial effort along those lines that will 
insure speedy victory-and justice to every citizen. [Emphasis 
added )53 
Eisenhower's industrial mobilization planning agency was to be more of 
a forum for ascertaining the most effective policies as opposed to a vehi-
cle for declaring government directives. The IMP agency Eisenhower 
envisioned emphasized cooperation, teamwork, and unity. Only as a last 
resort would it issue orders. 54 
Finally, Eisenhower warned his readers that such a mobilization of 
industry would need to be done quickly; a modern enemy would not 
likely allow its opponent time to mobilize and organize its industry as 
had usually been the case in the past. The failure to carefully prepare, to 
be ready, could mean defeat. 55 
As we shall see, some of the details of the IMP would change, but the 
basic ideas that underlay it would not. Above all, Eisenhower envisioned 
cooperation between government, industry, labor, and the military. 
Indeed, for Eisenhower the entire nation would constitute one great 
team with its collective face set resolutely toward victory. 56 This philos-
ophy of teamwork, cooperation, and compromise would manifest itself 
throughout Eisenhower's Army career and into the presidency.57 Mose-
ley was impressed with Eisenhower's article and with his abilities. Mose-
ley later wrote of him: "He has a remarkable mind and an equally 
talented pen, enabling him to present a subject simply and clearly."58 
One of the primary obstacles to Hurley's work was, as mentioned, 
Chief of Staff Summerall. Fortunately for the Secretary, Summerall's 
term as chief ended in late 1930. Hoover's dilemma was whom to appoint 
53. Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization," 138-42. 
54. Dwight Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Indus-
trial Mobilization," 2 October 1931 (a paper Eisenhower wrote while a student at the 
Industrial War College), in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and 
Selected Papers, 187, 188. Eisenhower's conception of the IMP was similar to his 
vision for the American Assembly, a think tank that he created while President of 
Columbia University from 1948 to 1952. The American Assembly was a forum for 
bringing together business leaders, academic experts, and other interested persons of 
talent or stature to analyze the nation's major problems and propose solutions. 
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 482. For a full 
description of the American Assembly, see Travis Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia 
(Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001). 
55. Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization." 
56. Ibid.; Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial 
Mobilization," 184, 187, 188. 
57. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 271, 
272; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1984), 622-24. 
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as his successor. There were numerous superb candidates. Fox Conner 
was General Pershing's personal choice, but Pershing was in France 
attending to Battle Monuments Commission business and was thus 
unable to personally press Conner's case. William D. Connor, the highly 
respected leader of the Army War College, was another possibility, as was 
George Moseley. But the man who had Hoover's respect, the man whom 
the country knew best because of his combat record in the Great War, 
and who had brought long-needed reforms to West Point, was Major Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur. Hoover chose MacArthur. 59 
It is interesting to note that Dwight Eisenhower was well known and 
highly respected by three of the leading candidates for chief of staff in 
1930. These men had served on Pershing's staff in the Great War: Con-
ner was G-3 (operations), and Connor was G-4 (supply), succeeded by 
Moseley.60 MacArthur later wrote that Eisenhower had established a well-
earned reputation for being an "outstanding soldier."61 When Eisenhower 
became famous in 1942, the media wondered where he had come from; 
many asked if his rise to fame and power was accidental or due just to 
luck. But the fact is that Eisenhower was well known, his talents held in 
the highest regard by many of those who led the Army. There was less 
luck than talent involved in his rise to high command. Addressing this 
persistent and pernicious myth, Bernard Baruch has written: "Eisen-
hower's spectacular rise was no accident. General [George C.] Marshall 
chose him, over many of his seniors, to lead the Allied forces because he 
recognized his many talents and abilities."62 Baruch, intimately 
acquainted with the Army and its officer corps, and a friend of George 
Marshall since a 1922 hunting trip, was in a position to know. 63 
It is not too much to say that Eisenhower's service with MacArthur 
would, over the years, change his life. In the fall of 1930 the new Chief 
of Staff took an avid interest in the work of the Assistant Secretary of 
War and his aides. Hurley met with MacArthur, Moseley, and Eisenhower 
to discuss the details of the IMP. The men found they agreed on most of 
59. Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 106-10; D. Clayton James, 
The Years of MacArthur, vol. 1, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1970), 343,344. I am aware of the controversy over who opposed and who supported 
MacArthur's candidacy; James and Wilson agree that Hoover ultimately made his own 
decision. 
60. Gary Mead, The Doughboys: America and the First World War (New York: 
Overlook Press, 2000), 108. 
61. Douglas MacArthur to Dwight Eisenhower, 30 September 1935, Misc. File, 
Box 24, Dwight Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-1952, EL. 
62. Bernard Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960), 404. 
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the important aspects of the plan. Morale in the Army in general, and the 
Planning Branch in particular, rose dramatically. 64 
Those who were primarily responsible for the creation of a compre-
hensive industrial mobilization plan in the early 1930s were Secretary of 
War Hurley, his assistant Frederick Payne, Douglas MacArthur, George 
van Hom Moseley, Bernard Baruch, and Dwight Eisenhower. But it was 
Eisenhower who did much of the research, visited factories , talked to 
industrial leaders, took into account his superior's opinions, conceptual-
ized what the plan should include, wrote most of it, and did much of the 
arguing for the IMP with both civilians and his Army superiors. The IMP 
thus contained many of his ideas regarding war and how it should be 
waged.65 Though Eisenhower was the lowest in rank of the men cited 
above, he was unusually persuasive with both oral and written arguments. 
Eisenhower drew heavily on the wisdom of the past in the form of 
Bernard Baruch and, as we have seen, his own studies at the Army War 
College. He had probably come to his conclusions regarding the neces-
sity of industrial planning and preparation independently of Baruch, but 
Baruch unquestionably imparted to Eisenhower much of the form that 
such planning and preparation should take. Eisenhower was far closer to 
Baruch in his ideas than most War Department officers.66 Though Baruch 
was a Democrat who advocated virtual government control of crucial 
industries in the event of war, Eisenhower respected his views, adopted 
many of them, and developed a friendship with the stock speculator that 
lasted until his death. Indeed, Eisenhower, more than any other Army 
officer, agreed with Baruch's views, attempted to persuade his Army col-
leagues that most of Baruch's ideas were superior to their own, and 
incorporated as many of them as he could into the 1930 IMP.67 It is then 
no surprise that Baruch thought much more highly of the 1930 IMP than 
the 1929 version.68 Indeed, historian and Baruch biographer John 
64. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 133. 
65. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Chief of the Planning Branch, 7 Novem-
ber 1930, File 44, Box 6, Memoranda to Planning Branch, 1931-1932, Assistant Sec-
retary of War, Planning Branch, RG 107, NARA; The 1930 Industrial Mobilization 
Plan, File 110, Box 12, Records of the Planning Branch, Procurement Division, Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1921-1941, RG 107, NARA; Schwarz, The Specu-
lator, 337. Schwarz credits MacArthur, Baruch, and Eisenhower, but it seems to me 
that the other three were also important factors. Holland, Eisenhower Between the 
Wars, 161. 
66. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211; Schwarz, The Speculator, 337. Eisenhower did 
not meet Baruch until 1930, well after he wrote his Army War College paper. Of 
course, Baruch's ideas were well publicized before that time. 
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Schwarz has called Eisenhower Baruch's "most apt pupil in the mili-
tary. "69 Eisenhower wrote in At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends: 
High officials believed that a war should be conducted through the 
normal, peacetime agencies of government. They did not favor price 
controls. They saw no reason for special organization. Those of us 
who believed in Baruch's policies argued that competition between 
departments of government would interfere with maximum indus-
trial production. They would answer that co-operation between the 
Army and Navy would be enough to take care of the problem. 
Eisenhower was too much the historian and realist to fall for that rea-
soning: 
All our experience has shown that this was convenient reasoning and 
foolishness. Even during war against a common enemy, armies and 
navies of the same nation have often delighted in warring against 
each other for guns, men-and applause. 70 
Eisenhower was the primary author of the 1930 IMP, which thus 
benefited from many of his talents. 71 Two seem especially important. 72 
First was his amazing memory. His wife, Mamie, later recalled that he 
"knew by heart production man-hours on everything from a bomber to 
a mess kit."73 Another of Eisenhower's great qualities was his basic 
humility; he was usually willing to listen to the ideas of others, including 
civilians, to profit from their experience. Some writers have interpreted 
this trait negatively: Eisenhower was easily dominated by more forceful 
men and their ideas.74 This generalization might be valid if Eisenhower 
had adopted the ideas of such men wholesale, but such was not the case. 
He was eclectic, picking and choosing among the ideas he thought best 
and then adding his own. Consequently, Eisenhower's work was almost 
always reflective of a greater store of knowledge than his own experi-
ences would suggest. 75 His work on the IMP exhibits this most positive of 
traits. 
Eisenhower adopted some, but not all, of Baruch's philosophy. 
Baruch believed that in modem war there was little room for free enter-
69. Schwarz, The Speculator, 391. 
70. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211, 212; Schwarz, The Speculator, 338. 
71. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930; Eisenhower, At Ease, 211. 
72. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930. 
73. Dorothy Brandon, Mamie Doud Eisenhower: A Portrait of a First Lady (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), 171. 
74. For Eisenhower as easily swayed, dominated, or indecisive, see Brendon, 
Ike, 59, 110, 114, 133, 138, 155, 156, 160, 163, 168, 175; D'Este, Patton, 48<r89; 
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bleday and Company, Inc., 1978), 74. 
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prise: the government must control all aspects of the economy; both cap-
ital and labor must be subservient to the nation's security interest. He 
argued that prices of all goods be capped so as to both secure the econ-
omy against inflation and provide as much military power for the dollar 
as possible. In addition, labor should be organized to facilitate optimum 
production. Baruch, as the head of the War Industries Board in 1918, 
was associated in the popular mind with highly coercive policies toward 
both industry and labor. 76 In 1930 he was careful to disavow any sugges-
tion that he favored "conscription of labor," but this disavowal was a bit 
disingenuous. Baruch believed labor should be cajoled, coerced, and 
controlled as necessary: a central government agency would orchestrate 
the allocation of labor. 77 He supported what was known as a "work or 
fight" bill. 78 Indeed, Baruch believed that in the event of a major war all 
aspects of the economy, not just war production, had to come under gov-
ernment control in order to protect the living standards of the populace. 
This, in turn, would allow for the maintenance of morale. In order to 
achieve the foregoing, Baruch advocated the creation of a permanent 
superagency along the lines of the old War Industries Board. 79 In short, 
Baruch would end economic freedom during war in order to preserve it 
for peace. Finally, his plan would enhance the role of civilian business-
men and industrialists in determining what was needed and who would 
produce it.80 · 
Eisenhower's Army plan featured less centralized control than 
Baruch's plan, but far more than the old system. 81 Several sources indi-
cate the leading ideas regarding the Army's industrial mobilization plan 
as advocated by Dwight Eisenhower: the speech he wrote for Payne to 
deliver to the Army War College, the article he wrote for Payne published 
in Army Ordnance, the 1930 IMP itself, his paper for the Army Indus-
trial College (where he was a student in 1931), and his article for the 
Cavalry Journal of November 1931. The three former sources, of 
course, reflect more than Eisenhower's own ideas, but it would be a 
76. Morris V. Rosenbloom, Peace Through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a 
Blueprint For Security (Washington: American Surveys, 1953), 149. 
77. Baruch, The Public Years, 321-28. 
78. Ibid., 326. 
79. Statement of Bernard Baruch to the War Policies Commission, 6 March 
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and Selected Papers, 145. 
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mistake to severely discount the degree to which Eisenhower's ideas are 
represented in the work he did for Payne and in the industrial mobiliza-
tion plan. He was no mere typist; he was asked to write these documents 
because of the respect he had gained from Payne, Moseley, and others. 
Moreover, Moseley highly valued creativity and initiative, and Eisenhower 
knew it.82 These documents, then, do not conceal Eisenhower as much as 
they reveal him. Of course, in the Industrial College paper and the jour-
nal article, he was relatively free to write whatever he chose in terms of 
philosophy. At the end of the day, these sources differ little in regard to 
basic ideas; they also reflect and advance ideas that Eisenhower had writ-
ten about in his work at the Army War College in 1927-28.83 
Eisenhower believed that modern war against a great power required 
an immediate and massive response. Such a war was essentially two-fold: 
it involved a traditional battlefield transformed by modern weapons and 
the industrial capabilities of an entire people. These capabilities had to 
be organized ahead of the actual conflict.84 In 1953, President Eisen-
hower, remembering the American propensity to dismantle its defensive 
capability, asserted "that we would not again become so weak militarily 
as to encourage aggression."85 But who should organize industry to meet 
such a sudden challenge? In the 1930s, Eisenhower was sure that only 
high-ranking civilian authorities in government could perform that func-
tion. Here he was in opposition to many officers in the War Department 
who believed that the Army could coordinate with individual businesses 
to supply itself.86 Eisenhower's plan thus featured not only government 
control of war production, but also the creation of a special wartime 
body, led by civilians, that would exercise that control along the lines of 
the War Industries Board of the Great War era. 87 Both Baruch and 
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MacArthur favored this approach.88 The difference between the Army's 
plan and the Baruch view was that in the former plan this coordinating 
agency would not come into existence until the President, facing either 
the threat or the reality of war, so decreed. 89 That decree would consti-
tute the so-called M-Day. Baruch insisted that the controlling agency be 
created as soon as possible and perform its duties permanently.90 
The 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured four separate "super-
agencies," one each for war industries, war labor, selective service, and 
public relations. The war industries agency was to be dominant, but all 
four were to be represented, along with the Army and Navy, on the Advi-
sory Council to the President. An official Army historian remarks, 
"Broad decisions of wartime policy would be made by the President and 
his council, to be executed by the council members through their 
respective organizations. "91 
There was still more disagreement between Eisenhower and Baruch 
over the role of civilians. The latter envisioned not only a civilian-led 
superagency, but also greater prewar civilian leadership in determining 
who would produce what items. Many Army officers were afraid that 
Baruch's plan deprived the Army of essential decision-making powers. It 
also demonstrated greater concern for civilian wartime living standards 
than the Army version.92 Eisenhower, as one would expect, was in favor 
of cooperation and compromise. 
Another goal of the IMP was to "equalize the burdens of war," specif-
ically to reduce the profits that industrialists had made during the last 
war. The most radical of ideas, to nationalize industry, was opposed by 
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90. Address by Payne (Eisenhower), 6 January 1931, 149, 153; Eisenhower, 
"Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization," 184; Eisen-
hower, "War Policies," 199; Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 67; Schwarz, 
The Speculator, 332-38; New York Times, 14 May 1931. 
91. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 78, 79. 
92. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, SIS. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Baruch, who preferred to cap all prices for the duration of the emer-
gency.93 Indeed, Baruch would cap not only the prices of goods associ-
ated with war production, but virtually all prices. 94 Eisenhower agreed 
with Baruch, but most Army officials were opposed to "radical changes 
in normal economic relationships between individuals and between indi-
viduals and Government." They did, however, reluctantly admit that 
something had to be done to control profits. 95 They advocated capping 
profits at 6 percent.96 At the outbreak of hostilities a "systematic regis-
tration of wealth" would take place and "tax legislation framed to place 
an equitable burden thereon" created.97 
Eisenhower's and Baruch's argument that some form of "price stabi-
lization" was necessary led Army leaders to envision doing away with 
cost-plus contracts awarded to the lowest bidder.98 They preferred pre-
war agreements between the Army and manufacturers that stipulated 
these manufacturers would produce a given product at a given price. The 
advantage to this system was that the Army could plan who was to pro-
duce what, and negotiate prices in a stable economic environment. The 
Army planners believed that this method, along with some modest price 
controls, would also help control inflation. 
Eisenhower was the Army's strongest advocate of Baruch-like price 
controls and continued to argue for them even after the 1930 Industrial 
Mobilization Plan was completed. The price control features of the 1930 
IMP were merely a first step for Baruch and his pupil; there were those 
in and out of the Army who wanted no controls whatsoever, or thought 
Baruch's ideas too rigid.99 Moseley was among the latter. Eisenhower 
apparently urged Moseley and Baruch to continue to discuss the issue.100 
In his Industrial College paper of October 1931, Eisenhower referenced 
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94. Ibid.; Carter Field, Bernard Baruch: Park Bench Statesman (New York: 
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a letter from Moseley to Baruch the previous May in which Moseley 
describes his now more complete understanding of Baruch's ideas and 
expresses some acquiescence in them.101 In his article for the Ca'Valry 
Journal, Eisenhower provided a staunch defense of Baruch's price-cap-
ping program that indicates the author personally preferred that method 
over the taxing of profits the Army plan envisioned. One of the Baruch 
plan's strengths was its greater control of inflation not only in war pro-
duction but also in the domestic economy as a whole. The Army plan, 
with its ambiguous price "stabilization" concept, risked far greater infla-
tionary pressures as profits grew if costs escalated.102 By the time Dou-
glas MacArthur testified before the War Policies Commission in the 
spring of 1931, the Army's price stabilization program, though not as 
sweeping as Baruch's concept, was far more developed and specific. As 
the Army's foremost proponent of price controls and the author of 
MacArthur's statement to the War Policies Commission, Eisenhower had 
much to do with this move toward price controls.103 Eisenhower left the 
Planning Branch in 1932, but he and Baruch continued to advocate a 
"total [price) stabilization plan" throughout the 1930s.l04 
Eventually many of the price control concepts in the industrial 
mobilization plans of the 1930s were used in the era of the Second World 
War.105 The 1933 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured an even greater 
determination to see price controls implemented in time of war. That 
plan included a "separate price control appendix describing the history, 
objectives and methods of price control, together with recommended 
legislation and a wartime price control organization. "106 
Of all the IMPs, the 1930 version was the friendliest to labor and 
received by far the most labor support.107 As we have seen, Baruch was 
associated with the coercive labor policies the Woodrow Wilson admin-
istration had approved reluctantly in the Great War. The idea of con-
scripting labor in the event of a major war was so politically volatile that 
Congress had barred the War Policies Commission from considering it.108 
Eisenhower's 1930 Army plan specifically rejected conscription of labor, 
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arguing that it would be enormously divisive at precisely the moment the 
nation needed unity. Instead, with some input from labor organizations 
like the American Federation of Labor, it posited a "Labor Administra-
tion" that would seek to ensure that labor was fully employed and fairly 
treated. 109 
Another important element of the Army plan, one that has received 
little attention, was the intent to create an office of public information.110 
Eisenhower may not have originally suggested this idea, but he fully sup-
ported it. He believed that maintenance of civilian morale was funda-
mental to achieving victory in war, and that providing information that 
served that purpose should be a key component of any plan. Ill 
If the nation were to be ready for a modern war, ready to convert its 
economy quickly and efficiently to war production, it would need a 
group of experts devoted to creating and revising the plans for that even-
tuality. The Army IMP envisioned the enlargement of the staff of officers 
who were trained in that work and assigned to it on a relatively perma-
nent basis. Eisenhower's working title for this group of officers, who 
would be led by a civilian, was the "War Department Economic Staff."112 
Eisenhower was distraught to discover how much Army-Navy squab-
bling existed in the 1920s and '30s, especially in regard to procurement 
of supplies. He made great efforts to persuade those concerned with the 
nation's security that teamwork and cooperation among the various ser-
vices, institutions, and offices were essential if adequate defensive capa-
bility was to be achieved.m Trite though it may be, Eisenhower originally 
drew this lesson from his athletic days and saw it reinforced as he gained 
experience in the Army. In the Second World War he preached and exhib-
ited the highest form of teamwork, and often used a football team as an 
example. Though the Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) had been 
created in 1922 to coordinate munitions procurement, it had accom-
plished little. The board had insufficient power, and disagreements 
between the Army and Navy made it largely ineffective. Matters were get-
109. Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial 
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MacArthur to the War Policies Commission, 1931; Kreidberg and Henry, History of 
Military Mobilization, 510; Thatcher, Planningjorlrulustrial Mobilization, 160, 161, 
166. 
110. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, p. 40; Thatcher, Planning for Irulustrial 
Mobilization, 165. 
111. Dwight Eisenhower to Herbert E. [B.) Swope, 11 March 1931, in Holt and 
Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries arul Selected Papers, 167. 
112. Address by Payne (Eisenhower), 6 January 1931, 149, 150; Industrial Mobi-
lization Plan, 1930, pp. 34, 170. 
113. Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial 
Mobilization," 184; Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization." 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ting worse, not better; the winter of 1930 saw the nadir of Army-Navy 
relations in regard to procurement.114 
Eisenhower decided to do something about the problem. In the arti-
cle entitled "Peacetime Difficulties of Procurement Planning" he wrote 
for Moseley in January of that year, he asserted: 
One of the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon an organization, 
is the lack of close cooperation and coordination (or rather lack of 
mutual understanding) between the Army and the Navy. It is useless 
to assert the fault lies wholly with either side .. . above all, lack of 
appreciation in the highest positions of the great importance and 
deadly seriousness of the problem involved, have prevented that 
meeting of minds between the personnel of these two departments 
which is a prerequisite to a successful solution.115 
Eisenhower's article helped set in motion a chain of events that led to the 
reorganization and revitalization of the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board.116 Moseley used it to launch a cooperation campaign. That summer 
the Navy began giving the Army "lists of facilities that the Navy considered 
essential for some of its production" and established "joint machinery for 
coordinating the industrial plans of the two services."117 In 1931 Payne 
wrote in his annual report that he was "particularly gratified to report that 
the procurement activities of the War and Navy Departments are being 
constantly brought into close co-ordination."118 Eisenhower wanted to 
make the ANMB one of the key agencies in the 1930 Industrial Mobiliza-
tion Plan.119 Moseley refused, citing time constraints and his own uncer-
tainty as to the effectiveness of the still pending reforms.120 However, when 
the IMP was revised in May 1931, a reference to the ANMB was included. 
Eventually the reorganized ANMB became "the sponsor of the plan for 
industrial mobilization and successfully coordinated the ideas of the two 
departments [War and Navy] in developing these plans."121 
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In November 1930 the Planning Branch officers given the job of writ-
ing the IMP failed. Three years earlier, when officers assigned to the Bat-
tle Monuments Commission could not create an acceptable guidebook to 
the American battlefields and cemeteries of the Great War, the project 
was given to Eisenhower, who produced a much-appreciated document. 
Now Moseley asked Eisenhower to write the IMP. In spite of the fact that 
Eisenhower did not enjoy working on the industrialization plan, which 
he called a "long irksome job," he completed the plan in a week of hard 
writing.122 His greatest challenge, he later recalled, came in the "selec-
tion and arrangement of material." 123 
Eisenhower's work was impressive. Upon perusing the 1930 plan, 
Lieutenant Colonel McCain, who had worked on the 1928 plan, wrote, 
"they have made great strides back there [the Planning Branch] since 
our day. Among other things they have finished up a very comprehen-
sive Industrial Mobilization Plan covering the entire field . . . it repre-
sents an exhaustive piece of work. "124 
Eisenhower himself acknowledged the impact of his Industrial Mobi-
lization Plan work on his life. 
In these positions [working for the Assistant Secretary of War] I had 
been forced to examine world-wide military matters and to study 
concretely such subjects as the mobilization and composition of 
armies, the role of air forces and navies in war, tendencies toward 
mechanization, and the acute dependence of all elements of military 
life upon the industrial capacity of the nation. This last was to me 
of especial importance because of my intense belief that large-scale 
motorization and mechanization and the development of air forces 
in unprecedented strength would characterize successful military 
forces of the future .. . . The years de<Voted to work of this kind 
opened up to me an almost new world. During that time I met and 
worked with many people whose opinions I respected highly, in both 
military and civil life. [Emphasis added)125 
Eisenhower's 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured the creation 
of a civilian-led planning agency that would come into being at the begin-
ning of an emergency. This superagency would coordinate the industrial 
production of the nation and advise the President regarding that pro-
duction. In the meantime, an expanded staff of Army officers would work 
with businessmen to plan the production of war materials. Second, busi-
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ness profits would be capped at 6 percent, cost-plus contracts would not 
be used, and the Army would move toward price controls to check infla-
tion. Third, there would be no conscription of labor; a labor administra-
tion would coordinate the needs of industry and labor. Finally, an office 
of public information would educate the public to keep morale high and 
the nation unified. 
At the end of 1930, General Moseley left his job as Payne's assistant 
to become MacArthur's Deputy Chief of Staff. On 23 November Moseley 
invited Eisenhower to his home for a conversation. The general apolo-
getically informed his aide of his impending departure. Eisenhower had 
been told much earlier that he would leave whenever his chief departed, 
but Payne understandably could not part with both of them at the same 
time. Then Moseley told Eisenhower that the Assistant Secretary had 
been so impressed with his work that he wanted Eisenhower to take over 
Moseley's job. Unfortunately, he also said he had informed Payne that 
Eisenhower's rank precluded that appointment; the job demanded at 
least a full colonel. As consolation, Moseley told Eisenhower that Payne's 
request would be placed in his service record.126 
Payne was not satisfied with that gesture. In a speech a few weeks 
later at the Army War College, Payne, for a moment, left the remarks that 
Eisenhower had prepared for him and inserted a call for reform of the 
promotion system to allow for rewarding merit and ability. Reform of the 
system, he knew, was one of MacArthur's priorities. The Army Chief of 
Staff was working with the Hoover administration to pass legislation that 
would allow the Army to consider merit above seniority in the promotion 
to colonel as it already was for general officers. But no changes were 
forthcoming during the Hoover administration. On his own initiative 
MacArthur had de-emphasized seniority to some extent at that level. But 
apparently Eisenhower was still too junior to meet that lower standard.127 
Unfortunately for the Army planners, the proposed creation of civil-
ian-led agencies that were outside the framework of normal governmen-
tal machinery became a fatal flaw in the plan after the election of 
1932.128 The Army's industrial mobilization plan, as originally envi-
sioned, was to be revised and updated every few years. This was done. 
Details were changed in 1933 and 1936 but the basic plan still envisaged 
that superagencies to control war industrialization would come into exis-
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tence once an emergency was declared. 129 As General Moseley observed, 
the superagencies were the "most important part" of the plan. But with 
the ascension of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1933, peace-
time governmental machinery took the form of the New Deal. The politi-
cians and bureaucrats who ran the New Deal were suspicious of any 
rivals to their power, especially rivals who would come from the military 
or the business community as the IMP envisioned. Making matters 
worse, the Army did a poor job of explaining to the public and to gov-
ernment officials the rationale behind its plans. 130 In revising the plans 
through the mid-1930s, it also moved away from cooperation with labor 
just as labor was becoming more important politically.131 
Though Army leaders could not be certain that the President would 
adopt the IMP, grassroots work continued. After the Army surveyed over 
20,000 U.S. factories to discover their capacities and expertise in creat-
ing war supplies, 10,000 plants were selected for war manufacture. More-
over, there was significant, if not perfect, cooperation between the 
military and business leaders. The suggestions made by industrialists 
regarding design of munitions and standardization of components were 
often accepted. 132 
In 193 7 new Assistant Secretary of War Louis A. Johnson was deter-
mined to stimulate industrial mobilization planning. Signs of trouble in 
Europe and in Asia provided impetus to Johnson's efforts, and Bernard 
Baruch continued to advocate greater preparedness.133 Johnson proceeded 
along the lines of the Army's original IMPs: superagencies that arose at the 
time of the crisis would coordinate war production. Unfortunately for 
Johnson and the nation-at least in terms of military efficiency-Presi-
dent Roosevelt had no intention of relinquishing control of war industrial-
ization to agencies outside his own direct supervision.134 True, the 
superagencies were to answer to the President, but FDR was convinced 
that his own authority would be compromised under the Army plan. 135 
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The 1939 revision of the IMP, influenced by Baruch, was ostensibly 
designed to meld efficiently with New Deal agencies. But, as Albert Blum 
has shown, the President was afraid that the Army plan, by empowering 
business leaders and the military, would effectively end the New Deal 
and result in the loss of many of its accomplishments.136 In an incredible 
case of miscommunication between the President and Johnson, or out-
right bullheadedness on Johnson's part, his plan featured a new War 
Resources Administration (WRA) that would oversee most of the other 
war agencies contemplated in earlier plans. Johnson's plan gave great 
powers to the leader of this agency who, though still theoretically under 
the President's authority, would of necessity operate with a great deal of 
autonomy.137 There was no chance that such a plan would be acceptable 
to FDR. 138 At one point he remarked to an adviser regarding the WRA, 
"these 'fellows' wanted him to 'abdicate.' "139 The President decided to 
ignore the administrative aspects of the Army plan and in action remi-
niscent of the New Deal, create his own agencies, all answerable to 
him.140 Roosevelt's agencies would necessarily be created from scratch, 
and thus they entered the fray late; worse, their responsibilities were 
poorly defined and often overlapped.141 
As defense appropriations rose in the years before American entry 
into the Second World War, the Army and Navy continued to place their 
own contracts with suppliers, competing for precious commodities and 
bidding up prices. If the IMP of 1930 had been followed, this foolishness 
would not have occurred. The failure to institute centralized planning 
from 1939 into 1943 resulted in enormous logjams of goods and serious 
delays in production.142 David Kennedy has described it: 
Straining to meet the ambitious goals the president had set, pro-
curement officers loosed their imaginations, abandoned any vestige 
of managerial discipline, and lost all sight of the larger context within 
which they were operating. Military purchase orders became hunt-
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ing licenses, unleashing a jostling frenzy of competition for materials 
and labor in the jungle of the marketplace. 
Kennedy continued: 
Makers of cargo vessels gobbled up steel supplies, snarling the con-
struction of warships. Naval purchasing agents robbed aircraft 
assembly plants of aluminum. Locomotive foundries converted to 
tank production when locomotives were far more urgently needed. 
When construction was not stalled outright, it could end up uselessly 
squandered ... . At the same time, troops in training were throwing 
rocks in the grenade course and using firecrackers to simulate the 
scarce live ammunition that had to be carefully husbanded for the 
battlefield.143 
The United States eventually became the great "Arsenal of Democ-
racy" but only because of two fortuitous factors: time and distance. If the 
continental United States had not been thousands of miles from the 
major battlefields, the nation would not have had the time to properly 
organize for war. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
1941, it took Roosevelt over a year of war to finally coordinate industrial 
mobilization planning under one man who could give it most of his atten-
tion. In 1943, Roosevelt confidant and former Supreme Court Justice 
James F. Byrnes became head of the Office of War Mobilization. Byrnes's 
office was in the White House. 144 
The President's war mobilization program fell far short of the 1930 
IMP in other ways as well. Indeed, there is a tremendous sense of irony 
in comparing the Army IMP of 1930 to what actually occurred in the war. 
The Army plan, created by conservative men such as Payne, MacArthur, 
and Eisenhower, envisioned a far more centralized, controlled, and prof-
itless war than the great architect of the New Deal produced. Though no 
plan could have solved all of the difficulties the United States incurred in 
converting to war production, it seems reasonable to observe that the 
Army plan in virtually any of its manifestations of the 1930s would have 
coordinated war production more effectively than FOR's haphazard pro-
gram. Industrial mobilization planning was not a great president's finest 
hour. Cost-plus contracts, inherently inflationary and wasteful-and for-
bidden in the 1930 plan-were used extensively during the war. The 
margin of allowable profit was 10 percent, almost double the profit left to 
manufacturers in the Army plan of 1930.145 
Because the Army's IMP, in terms of its organizational scheme, was 
not adopted by Roosevelt in the years just before United States entry 
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into World War II, historians and biographers have often dismissed 
Eisenhower's work on the plan as unimportant or have given this period 
of his life scant attention.146 While it is true that Roosevelt did not adopt 
the administrative machinery that the Army recommended, the grass-
roots work that Army officers did in the 1930s as they talked with busi-
ness leaders, created relationships with them, explained needs and 
concerns, and wrote and revised conversion and production plans, made 
the path to effective war industrialization smoother than it would have 
been otherwise.147 Concerning the value of the IMP, Burnham Finney, 
editor of American Machinist and author of Arsenal of Democracy, judi-
ciously wrote in 1941: 
Are we farther along today, now that we are in an emergency, than if 
we hadn't had the industrial mobilization scheme in operation for 
many years? The unqualified answer is yes, "yes, we are farther 
along." Proof? The army and navy knew what they wanted when the 
present emergency began. That, in the opinion of expert military 
men, is the outstanding difference between 1917 and today. The 
thousands of plants surveyed are now starting to make the products 
allocated to them under the plan. From the list of 20,000 plants [in 
the plan) have come many of the 30,000 manufacturers with direct 
defense contracts. Precious time has been saved; perhaps not 
enough of it, but some .... Altogether, the efforts quietly exerted by 
the army and navy during the years when war seemed remote have 
paid dividends.148 
In 1940, Assistant Secretary of War Johnson wrote in his annual report, 
"Without the benefit of plans perfected by twenty years of study the suc-
cessful and timely execution of this program [industrial mobilization for 
war] would have been virtually impossible." [Emphasis added)149 
Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, in his annual report for 
1941, also noted that the IMP had helped the nation prepare for war: 
While the industrial mobilization plan, 1939 revision, was not put 
into full operation, it was followed very closely in the war depart-
ment procurement activities. From August until the organization of 
the Priorities Super-Agency in the latter part of December 1940 the 
Army and Navy Munitions Board exercised the wartime priority 
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function (on a purely voluntary basis by industry, but nevertheless 
effectively)-in our Industrial Mobilization Plan, careful attention 
had been devoted to this as well as to other wartime super-agency 
functions .150 
The same year, in testimony before the Truman Committee, the Senate 
committee charged with investigating war mobilization, Patterson 
remarked: 
When the burden of the present defense program was placed on the 
Department, the supply services immediately started operating 
under the Industrial Mobilization Plan. They promptly placed orders 
for munitions with plants previously allocated, using informal com-
petition wherever possible. In this way, the Ordnance Department 
has placed 85 percent of its orders for small arms, artillery, and 
ammunition components with industrial concerns already familiar 
with the problems.151 
The students at the Army Industrial College concurred with the above 
comment: 
A consideration of the IMP, together with its development and the 
present situation, indicates that the IMP has been of great service in 
the present program of industrial mobilization. While the agencies 
are not strictly in accordance with those planned, the principles of 
the IMP appear to be in the process of being executed.152 
Just after Dwight Eisenhower completed his work on the 1930 Indus-
trial Mobilization Plan, Douglas MacArthur testified before the War Poli-
cies Commission that progress had been made relative to 1917: 
Today we have a skeletonized framework of a citizen Army capable 
of absorbing rapidly the military man power of the Nation (sic], 
whereas in 1917 we had to build up practically a complete organiza-
tion. Similarly, on the material side we are in intimate touch with the 
industrial structure under a plan which will enable American indus-
try to promptly absorb our war requirements. 153 
Moreover, according to the Army's World War II economic mobiliza-
tion historian, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which Eisenhower 
had helped energize in the early thirties, and which since that time had 
been largely guided by Army officers from the Planning Branch, 
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made substantial contributions to the rearmament program. It 
launched and directed the original priorities system for World War II, 
apportioned basic industrial capacity between the Army and Navy, 
cleared foreign contracts for munitions production in the United 
States, had an important role in breaking the machine tools bottle-
neck, compiled military requirements for numerous raw materials, 
and performed a wide array of other services.154 
Finally, in regard to the efficacy of the IMP program and thus the sig-
nificance of Eisenhower's work on it, the same historian has observed: 
The creation of the War Production Board shortly after Pearl Harbor 
did reflect, in many respects, the conception of the War Resources 
Administration [the last form of the controlling superagency] set 
forth in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Most of the plan's other fea-
tures, both organizational and functional, were utilized in the course 
of the emergency, as well as after Pearl Harbor, but without specific 
attribution to or necessarily resulting from the Industrial Mobiliza-
tion Plan itself. 155 
Dwight Eisenhower largely wrote the Army's first detailed IMP. In this 
effort he was an important player in stimulating and focusing the War 
Department's 1930-31 effort to create a comprehensive industrial mobi-
lization plan. 
In understanding this era and Eisenhower's place in it, it is impera-
tive to remember also the larger political picture both in the Army and 
in the nation. The Army, particularly its planning for future wars, was 
unpopular in the country at large. The Army itself was divided over how 
that planning should proceed and how the economy should be organized 
in case of war. Hurley, Baruch, Payne, MacArthur, Moseley, and Eisen-
hower moved the nation to tolerate the idea of Army industrial planning 
for war, and moved the Army to accept a civilian-led centralized plan-
ning agency as the cornerstone of its industrialization plan. Army indus-
trialization planning proceeded throughout the 1930s, and a civilian-led 
administrative agency was the cornerstone of that plan throughout the 
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decade. Roosevelt's war production program benefited from the lower-
echelon work the Army had done in the years before the war, and 
eventually came back to the idea of a controlling superagency to govern 
war production. 156 
Eisenhower's work in these years also benefited him personally. He 
became acquainted with many of the nation's important business and 
political leaders, and a friend to a few. The influential Baruch, a Democ-
rat, would support him for President in 1952.157 Eisenhower learned how 
the federal government in Washington, D.C., worked and who worked 
it. 158 By the end of his service in the Assistant Secretary of War's office, 
he knew as much or more about planning for industrial mobilization as 
any officer in the Army. 
Indeed, in the mid-1960s, Eisenhower remembered just how signifi-
cant his work in this era had been for him. He wrote in At Ease: 
I now undertook work that was intriguing, and frustrating, but that 
ga"Ve me an early look at the military-industrial complex of whose 
pressures I would later warn. Except at that point, the pressures 
were exactly reversed. [Emphasis added)159 
During his presidency (1953-61), Eisenhower endeavored to create a 
defense establishment that was capable of defending the United States 
indefinitely, but which did not bankrupt the nation or fundamentally 
change its nature. For Eisenhower, both the old habit of dismantling the 
country's defensive capability after war, and the new threat of a defense 
establishment that fed on the fears of the nation and sucked away both 
freedom and prosperity, had to be avoided.'60 At the end of his adminis-
tration in January 1961 he warned the American people: 
In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition 
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the mili-
tary-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of mis-
placed power exists and will persist. 161 
Finally, Eisenhower's work in the early 1930s impressed MacArthur, 
who particularly appreciated Eisenhower's talent in writing. In 1931 the 
Chief of Staff asked Eisenhower, who at that time was still assigned to 
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Payne's office, to write his annual report. MacArthur wrote of the major's 
work: 
I desire to place on official record this special commendation for 
excellent work of a highly important nature which you have just 
completed under my personal direction. You not only accepted this 
assignment willingly-an assignment which involved much hard 
work-performing it in addition to your regular duties in the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of War, but you gave me a most acceptable 
solution within a minimum of time.162 
Mamie had the letter framed "to preserve it. "163 As Geoffrey Perret, an 
authority on both Eisenhower and MacArthur, has written, "such ful-
some praise from a Chief of Staff was almost unheard of."164 
MacArthur was also impressed with Eisenhower's ability to develop 
relationships with business leaders, a rare talent in the Army of that 
day.165 As things turned out, Eisenhower's relationship with the majestic, 
mercurial, and maddening MacArthur was just beginning. 
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